Google Will Give a Search Edge To Websites That Use Encryption 148
As TechCrunch reports, Google will begin using website encryption, or HTTPS, as a ranking signal – a move which should prompt website developers who have dragged their heels on increased security measures, or who debated whether their website was “important” enough to require encryption, to make a change. Initially, HTTPS will only be a lightweight signal, affecting fewer than 1% of global queries, says Google. ... Over time, however, encryption’s effect on search ranking [may] strengthen, as the company places more importance on website security. ... While HTTPS and site encryption have been a best practice in the security community for years, the revelation that the NSA has been tapping the cables, so to speak, to mine user information directly has prompted many technology companies to consider increasing their own security measures, too. Yahoo, for example, also announced in November its plans to encrypt its data center traffic.
Re: Great step! (Score:3, Informative)
Android Browser 2.x and IE/XP lack SNI (Score:5, Informative)
I mean, if you can't be bothered to buy a $50 SSL certificate and install it, are you *really* trustworthy?
It's not only the cost of a certificate, which StartSSL provides without charge to individuals. It's also a dedicated IPv4 address if you want to reach people still using Android 2 or Windows XP. A lot of entry-level hosting packages use name-based virtual hosting, and doing this over name-based virtual hosting requires the TLS stack to support Server Name Indication (SNI). Android Browser didn't gain support for SNI until Honeycomb (3.x) on tablets and ICS (4.0) on phones, and Internet Explorer didn't gain support for SNI until Windows Vista.
StartSSL or DANE (Score:3, Informative)
How about some sort of official public service that can hand out server certs of every registered domain?
You mean like StartSSL? Or what about DANE [wikipedia.org], which stores TLS certificates in DNSSEC?
HTTP-only ad networks (Score:4, Informative)
Re:Cat blog (Score:5, Informative)
That's part of it - a valuable enough part in itself, IMO; at least one UK ISP, TalkTalk, has started duplicating HTTP requests made by their customers [fluidinfo.com]: so, if you request http://example.com/stuff [example.com] on one of their lines, 30 seconds later they'll go and request the same URL themselves for monitoring purposes. Obviously, enabling SSL prevents this kind of gratuitous stupidity - and the previous incarnation of such snooping, Phorm [wikipedia.org]. If enough websites enable SSL, ISPs will no longer have the ability to monitor customer behavior that closely, all they will see are SSL flows to and from IP addresses, and whatever DNS queries you make to their servers, if any. (Use encrypted connections to OpenDNS or similar, and your ISP will only ever see IP addresses and traffic volume - exactly as it should be IMO!)
Re: Great step! (Score:5, Informative)
They do BUT
1: their rules on who can get the free certs seem to be varied and arbitary. I've seen reports of an opensource developer being given a free cert initially but then come renewal time told that merely having a donation button makes their site count as "ecommerce" and therefore ineligable
2: they make the expiry artifically short (the CA industry as a whole does this but startSSLs free certs are epecially bad),
3: they refuse to renew certs until just before they expire and refuse to reissue certs without revoking the old one.
4: each free cert only covers a domain and one hostname under that domain (e.g. bar.com and foo.bar.com). This effectively means you end up needing one IP per hostname you want SSL on (until IE on XP becomes insignificant anyway).
It's nice that there is a free (as in beer) option for some people but it's also clearly got a number of artificial restrictions on it to push people towards their paid options.
Re: Great step! (Score:5, Informative)
StartSSL still give out free certificates to individuals right?
Yes, as long as you don't change your certificate after the key is lost as a result of HeartBleed. [startssl.com] If you want your users to be secure, then you need to pony up $25. How that isn't a violation of the Mozilla policies is beyond me. I can give StartSSL clear proof that a private key has been disclosed, and they won't revoke it unless somebody pays them to do it.
Re:Cat blog (Score:5, Informative)
It's actually a lot more than that. HTTPS isn't just about protecting passwords anymore, not post Snowden.
Let us recall one of the more interesting things we learned about SSL via the NSA leaks: the Five Eyes countries apparently have not broken SSL yet despite that the internet is still not capable of stopping them. The reason is a system they've built called QUANTUM [wired.com].
QUANTUM is a series of systems that work together. Imagine it like being a giant set of guard towers on the internet backbone. QUANTUM is called that because it's based on deep packet inspection and insertion. The first part is a massive set of DPI devices that trawl unencrypted internet traffic passing through intercept points. These DPI devices can be configured by NSA/GCHQ analysts to look for selectors - personal identifiers like email addresses, IP addresses, cookies and so on. QUANTUM does not run on every internet link and cannot see through encrypted traffic, but that doesn't matter: it's like a searchlight crawling the grounds of a prison at night. It doesn't matter that it can't light up everywhere simultaneously - once tasked it will keep searching until it finds you. Given enough time and good selectors, it will always find you, simply because the average internet user makes many different unencrypted connections to many different websites.
Once QUANTUM locates an un-SSLd traffic stream that matches your selectors, the next step begins, this is called QUANTUM INSERT. You see these DPI devices are not only capable of reading traffic but also injecting packets directly onto the backbone as well. This allows them to race legitimate answers from the real servers, and redirect the victim to an entirely different server (this is probably based on racing DNS lookups although I think the leaked docs were fuzzy on this aspect). These races are called "shots" and interestingly, they don't always succeed - sometimes the NSA is slower than the real server. But QUANTUM keeps trying and eventually you end up connected to this new FOXACID server, which then proceeds to act as an HTTP proxy for the real request and injects an exploit kit. That then pwns your system such that the NSA can now see all your encrypted traffic, along with turning on your microphone and so on.
An observant reader will notice something very important about the above description. The longer you can stay in the SSLd web, the longer it will take for QUANTUM to hack you. That means you directly benefit from a website being SSLd even if all it contains is cat pictures and you don't even log in. Once QUANTUM has figured out your IP address, any non-SSLd HTTP connection is a useful foothold.
Re: Great step! (Score:4, Informative)
2: they make the expiry artifically short (the CA industry as a whole does this but startSSLs free certs are epecially bad),
A validity time of one year is pretty standard for SSL certs (paid certs often charge per year). Could they issue them for 20 years? Sure, but a one year validity is not unusual. Class 2 certs are good for two years.
3: they refuse to renew certs until just before they expire and refuse to reissue certs without revoking the old one.
I get renewal notices two weeks prior to expiration. That's pretty reasonable. If I recall correctly, I can generate a new cert for my site any time in that two-week period, so I don't need to wait for the cert to expire before replacing it.
While I wish they allowed free reissuance of certs at any time, I don't really see why requiring revocation is a showstopper.
4: each free cert only covers a domain and one hostname under that domain (e.g. bar.com and foo.bar.com). This effectively means you end up needing one IP per hostname you want SSL on (until IE on XP becomes insignificant anyway).
That's also the case for pretty much any of the inexpensive paid certs too. You can always get a wildcard cert but most CAs charge at least $100/year for a single wildcard cert. StartSSL charges $60 for Class 2 validation, and you can issue unlimited certs (wildcard or not). Organizations can get Class 2 certified for $120 ($60 for identity verification, $60 for organization verification) and can issue unlimited certs. For a company needing more than one cert, StartSSL is still cheaper.
It's nice that there is a free (as in beer) option for some people but it's also clearly got a number of artificial restrictions on it to push people towards their paid options.
Considering their paid certs are often cheaper than comparable offerings from other CAs, it doesn't really seem unreasonable to me. Doubly so because they're run by competent people who respond promptly to inquiries, even from free users. I've been a StartSSL customer for years (and also used other CAs like GoDaddy, Comodo, Thawte, etc.) and the customer service from StartSSL has always been excellent.
If you don't want to get a StartSSL cert or they don't meet your needs, that's fine. NameCheap and others sell single-domain Comodo certs for $9/year. RapidSSL certs are a buck or two more per year. That costs less than a single beer at the local bar. Hardly a massive expense.